February 15, 1996 - Washington Post: Don't Hobble Intelligence Gathering
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February 15, 1996 - Washington Post: Don't Hobble Intelligence Gathering
Don't Hobble Intelligence Gathering
Peace Corps Director Mark Gearan publicly rebuked Richard N. Haass in 1996 after Haass's op-ed piece appeared in the Washington Post suggesting that the Peace Corps should be used as a "cover" for confronting some of this country's most serious national security problems, such as "terrorists, drug cartels, criminal organizations and rogue states." and that the ban on using Peace Corps Volunteers to gather clandestine intelligence be lifted.
Read and comment on this op-ed from the Washington Post that for years, the CIA has followed directives that prevent it from using journalists, members of the clergy and Peace Corps volunteers so as not to jeopardize their safety or complicate their ability to perform their functions. In the post-Cold War world, the greatest threats are posed by terrorists, drug cartels, criminal organizations and rogue states. The question is whether precluding the use of such covers is a luxury the United States can still afford.
Read the op-ed then read Peace Corps Director Mark Gearan's reply to the op-ed below it at:
DON'T HOBBLE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING*
* This link was active on the date it was posted. PCOL is not responsible for broken links which may have changed.
DON'T HOBBLE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
Richard N. Haass
February 15, 1996; Page A27
A news story in The Post on Jan. 20 noted that a panel sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations was calling for relaxing rules governing covert action. An article by Dan Schorr followed on Feb. 4, in Outlook, under the headline: "Get Smart: Spies Posing as Reporters Is a Stupid Idea." Why, then, would a panel described by the original story as blue-ribbon suggest such changes? The answer is simple. They may be necessary to avoid limiting the effectiveness of an increasingly valuable foreign policy tool.
The most important function of the clandestine services -- mostly found in the CIA -- is the collection of human intelligence. Such intelligence can complement other sources and on occasion be the sole source of information. This tends to be true in closed societies, where decision-making and information are limited to a few and where the targeted activity is not easily captured by reconnaissance or eavesdropping. Human intelligence can also shed light on intentions and capabilities. Such knowledge is likely to prove crucial in tracking the activities of terrorists and unconventional weapons programs.
A second task for the clandestine services is covert action, the carrying out of operations to influence events in another country in which it is deemed important to hide the hand of the U.S. government. The capability to undertake such tasks -- be they to frustrate a terrorist action, intercept some technology or equipment that would help a rogue state or group build a nuclear device, or assist a group trying to overthrow a hostile leadership -- constitutes an important national security instrument.
Rules that work to discourage or even prohibit preemptive attacks on terrorists or support for individuals hoping to bring about a change of regime in a hostile country should be repealed. Executive orders first issued in 1976 by President Ford and reiterated by his successors, together with associated legislation, make it a crime to engage in or conspire to engage in political assassination. The effect is to inhibit efforts to work with non-Americans in trying to overthrow unfriendly and
A secondarea for possible reform involves the use of nonofficial "covers" for hiding and protecting those involved in clandestine activities. For years, the CIA has followed directives that prevent it from using journalists, members of the clergy and Peace Corps volunteers so as not to jeopardize their safety or complicate their ability to perform their functions.
The question is whether precluding the use of such covers is a luxury the United States can still afford. In the post-Cold War world, the greatest threats are posed by terrorists, drug cartels, criminal organizations and rogue states. Learning about and dealing with these threats is often achieved best by clandestine means. Moreover, posting intelligence officers to embassies is impossible in the absence of diplomatic relations, and of little use when the target is someone other than a government official.
Some slack can be picked up by making greater use of businessmen and academics, but they may not be enough. The claim that individuals will be tainted or even endangered if the ban on using them as spies is lifted is dubious. Even with the ban, nothing the U.S. government can do or say can convince others that no American journalist or clergyman or Peace Corps volunteer is a spy, especially as other countries place no such limits on themselves.
Third, we need to conduct oversight of clandestine activities with a large degree of realism. New guidelines governing contacts with foreign nationals have just been issued to operatives around the world. There is an obvious desire to avoid the embarrassment, or worse, of placing someone on the payroll who has committed crimes or human rights violations.
Our interests, however, sometimes require that we do just that. Clandestine operations, whether for collection of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence or covert action, will often require associating with individuals of unsavory reputation. This is little different from the tradition in law enforcement of using criminals to catch criminals, and should be acceptable so long as the likely benefits outweigh the certain moral and potential political costs.
None of the above is meant as a call to ignore the instances in which the CIA has acted with questionable legality and judgment. Constant vigilance is needed to ensure that it is doing quality work consistent with policy priorities, that senior officials inside and outside the CIA are kept fully informed and that its actions are consistent with existing regulations and laws.
But in return, those involved in clandestine activities should know that risk-taking will be supported and that they will be politically protected so long as what they do is authorized and legal under U.S. law at the time. Such support is crucial; contrary to widespread impressions, one problem with the clandestine services has been a lack of initiative brought about by restrictive regulations, a fear of retroactive discipline and a lack of high-level support. This must be rectified if weare to have the human intelligence and policy tools we will need.
The writer is principal author of a study on the future of U.S. intelligence published this week by the Council on Foreign Relations. He worked in the National Security Council in the Bush administration.
June 21, 1996 - Don't Spook the Peace Corps
Read and comment on this letter from Peace Corps Director Mark Gearan to the Washington Post responding to an op-ed piece by Richard Haass's that the Peace Corps should be used as a "cover" for confronting some of this country's most serious national security problems, such as "terrorists, drug cartels, criminal organizations and rogue states" at:
Don't Spook the Peace Corps*
* This link was active on the date it was posted. PCOL is not responsible for broken links which may have changed.
Don't Spook the Peace Corps
* Friday, June 21, 1996
* FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
* Contact: Brendan Daly
* (202) 606-3010
As the Peace Corps prepared this week to celebrate 35 years of voluntary service by more than 140,000 Americans, it was astounding to read Richard Haass's suggestion that the Peace Corps should be used as a "cover" for confronting some of this country's most serious national security problems, such as "terrorists, drug cartels, criminal organizations and rogue states" {"Don't Hobble Intelligence Gathering," op-ed, Feb. 15}. Haass further asserts that "nothing the U.S. government can do or say can convince others that no . . . Peace Corps volunteer is a spy." Finally, Haass questions the wisdom of continuing the current prohibition against using the Peace Corps as a cover for intelligence-gathering purposes and dismisses as "dubious" any concerns that a Peace Corps volunteer (or for that matter, a journalist or member of the clergy) might be tainted or put in danger if this policy were changed.
Haass should speak to a returned Peace Corps volunteer or those of us who work to support nearly 7,000 volunteers currently serving in 94 countries. His suggestion about making the Peace Corps a part of the intelligence community is both dangerous and cynical.
The strict separation -- both in fact and appearance -- between the Peace Corps and any intelligence agency has been a bedrock principle for every administration since 1961 to ensure the safety and security of volunteers. Peace Corps volunteers often serve in remote areas of their host countries without access to modern communications or special security arrangements. They are not government employees, are paid only a small subsistence allowance and are not granted any special privileges, such as diplomatic immunity. They are prohibited from involving themselves in the political affairs of their host countries. To suggest casually that the Peace Corps should be used as a "cover" to gather intelligence is reckless; to actually carry this out would place the lives of volunteers in serious danger.
The safety of volunteers is reason enough alone to keep intact the concrete wall between the Peace Corps and our intelligence community. But there is another reason that goes to the heart of what the Peace Corps is all about. The Peace Corps' mission calls for volunteers to live and work with people in developing countries at the grass-roots level and to strengthen mutual understanding between Americans and other people around the world. The work that volunteers do is, in other words, antithetical to intelligence activities, and without complete separation between the Peace Corps and our intelligence agencies, no government would have ever invited Peace Corps volunteers to serve in their countries.
It is true that in the past some Communist regimes and movements alleged for propaganda purposes that the Peace Corps was a front for the Central Intelligence Agency. But contrary to Mr. Haass's assertion, we have done a great deal to reassure our host-country governments that volunteers are exactly what we represent them to be: altruistic Americans who, in the spirit of trust and friendship, want to help make a difference in the lives of people around the world. In the face of hardship and sacrifice, they have led efforts to help address the pressing problems of poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and lack of economic opportunity. Over the decades they have touched the lives of countless people in the developing world. Because of their hard work and dedication, the Peace Corps has become one of this country's most successful and popular institutions. Volunteers have created a legacy that has generated enormous respect and goodwill for our country. The suggestion that this legacy should be used as a cover for intelligence activities reeks of cynicism.
Our intelligence community has its own mission, but the Peace Corps is not, and should not be, a part of it. Out of respect and concern for the personal safety of Americans who are serving their country as Peace Corps volunteers, Haass should withdraw his proposal.
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This story has been posted in the following forums: : Headlines; Inteligence Issues; Peace Corps Directors - Gearan
PCOL6984
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I met a guy some years ago shortly after returning from my Peace Corps service. He told me that when he was in law school, in the mid 1970's, he was recruited by the CIA. Their plan was to train him in intelligence gathering techniques by placing him in the Peace Corps. This guy was uncomfortable with doing that, and didn't join. When I told him about the separation between Peace Corps and the CIA, he said "Well, the CIA recruiters were very open about their plans to place me in the Peace Corps, it's not like they were trying to keep it hidden."
Whenever I read about the separation between the intelligence community and the Peace Corps, I think back to this conversation. How many PCV's really were spies?
